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1. Introduction: Mental Disorders as Emergent Properties 
In order to mechanistically explain how the brain gives rise to mental disorders, several 
problems need to be solved. First, one needs models of how the brain gives rise to the normal 
behaviors that are damaged or eliminated during the mental disorder. Then one needs to provide a 
clear description of which normal mechanisms are changed during the mental disorder. Many 
mental disorders may be traced to chemical or electrical imbalances of one sort or another. 
Knowing which chemical or electrical imbalance is involved is an important necessary condition 
for understanding the disorder, but it is far from sufficient. In addition, both for theoretical 
understanding and for informed clinical intervention, one needs to explain how each local lesion 
gives rise to the behavioral symptoms that characterize the disorder. Typically, such symptoms are 
emergent properties due to the interactions of many cells across the brain. Often these interactions 
involve nonlinear cell properties and feedback between cells operating on multiple spatial and 
temporal scales. Thus, when one says that an imbalance of dopamine metabolism "causes" 
schizophrenia or other mental disorders, such a statement may provide little insight into how this 
imbalance gives rise to the symptoms of schizophrenia, despite its great value in guiding the search 
for clinically effective drugs. A theoretical method is therefore needed that is strong enough to 
explain how local lesions give rise to behaviorally relevant emergent properties across such a 
complex system. 
Even in cases where a malfunction may be localized within a particular neural subsystem, 
this subsystem's interactions with several other subsystems may be disrupted. The other 
subsystems may then also contribute to abnormal symptoms. For example, if two subsystems are 
mutually inhibitory and one subsystem becomes abnormally hyporeactive, then the other 
subsystem may become abnormally hyperreactive, even though its own cells would otherwise 
perform normally. In such a situation, it may be difficult to decide, just by looking at small subsets 
of biochemical or neurophysiological data, whether the syndrome is due to hyporeactivity or to 
hyperreactivity. Due to the complementary reactions of the two subsystems, some measures of 
total system performance may show no effect or conflicting effects across subjects in whom the 
degree of imbalance varies. 
The present chapter discusses how some key symptoms of schizophrenia, Parkinson's 
disease, attention deficit disorder, and depression can be caused as emergent properties of neural 
models of behavior when their cellular parameters are perturbed out of the "normal" range. These 
examples do not purport to be complete explanations of the symptoms in question, but they do 
show how such a model can help to close the gap between brain and behavior. In particular, 
several behavioral properties of these models simultaneously covary in a manner that reflects 
clinical data when one of its cellular parameters is varied. Other behavioral properties serve as 
model predictions to further test the proposed explanation. Finally, the normal functioning of the 
model clarifies the transition between normal and abnormal behavioral stales. Each of these model 
circuits will be presented in its simplest possible form. For example, some properties are more 
easily demonstrated using excitatory transmitter substances, whereas they may be realized in vivo 
using a cascade of inhibitory transmitters that exert a disinhibitory action. 
2. The Golden Mean: Opponent Pmcessing, Inverted-U, and Rebound 
The models in question generate abnormal behavioral properties when they experience an 
abnormally low or high arousal level. Such a change may be due to a number of different factors. 
One key type of model involves an opponent processing circuit that has been called a gated dipole 
(Grossberg, I 972a, I 972b, 1980). Opponent processing can influence motivated behavior. Here 
the opponent channels may control such opposed motivational factors as fear and relief (Denny, 
1971; Estes and Skinner, I 94 I). Opponent processing also influences perceptual processing, 
where it may control opponent colors such as red and green, or perpendicular orientations such as 
vertical and horizontal, or opposite directions such as up or down (Brown, I 965; Helmholtz, 
I 866, 1962; Sekuler, I 975). Motor behaviors may also have an opponent organization, as 
illustrated by GO and STOP signals for gating the onset or offset of motor actions (Horak and 
Anderson, 1984a, 1984b), and the opponent organization and control of flexor and extensor 
muscle groups. 
Why is opponent processing so ubiquitous in the nervous system? It has been proposed 
(e.g., Grossberg, 1980) that opponent processing helps the brain to self-organize its neural circuits 
in a self-stabilizing way, both during childhood development and adult learning; that is, in a way 
that develops and learns neural circuits that match the statistics of the environment, and that 
dynamically buffers these circuits against catastrophic reorganization by irrelevant environmental 
fluctuations. 
Figure I 
Two key properties of these opponent processing circuits are their lnverted-U and reset 
properties. The Inverted-U property (Figure I) enables a gated dipole circuit to maintain a type of 
Golden Mean in response to the circuit's arousal leveL The concept of arousal level, as here used, 
needs to be carefully defined, because several different mechanisms can all change the arousal 
level, from a functional point of view, without seeming to be arousal-specific mechanisms. This 
Golden Mean says that circuit sensitivity to input fluctuations is optimal at moderate arousal levels, 
but degrades in different ways when the circuit is either underaroused or overaroused. These 
properties are mathematically proved in the Appendix. The main text will describe them 
heuristically. 
Such Inverted-U properties are well-known to occur in behavior. For example, D-
amphetamine sulfate activates feeding in an anorectic cat at the same dose that totally inhibits 
feeding in a normal cat (Wolgin et a!., 1976). In normal cats, smaller amounts of norepinephrine 
can have effects opposite to those of larger amounts (Leibowitz, 1974). In like manner, 
amphetamine augments slow behavior and depresses fast behavior (Dews, 1958). In humans, 
dopamine pharmacological manipulations have shown that the relation of dopamine activity to 
reaction-time performance is an Inverted-U function (Netter and Rammsayer, 1991; Rammsayer, 
Netter, and Vogel, 1993; Zuckerman, 1984). Subjects high on extraversion and sensation seeking 
scales show impaired task performance if a dopamine agonist is applied, and improved 
performance if an antagonist is applied. The opposite pattern was found in subjects low in these 
traits. Inverted-U's have also been reported in event-related potentials, such as the Contingent 
Negative Variation, or CNV (Tecce and Cole, 1974). In the analysis below of mental disorders, 
the assumption will be made, and supportive data cited, that various circuits are far off their 
optimal level of arousal, and are seriously underaroused or overaroused. 
Figure 2 
The reset property involves a process of antagonistic rebound that can be triggered in at 
least two ways. Both ways enable the circuit to shut off currently active cells, disconfirm their 
processing by transiently activating their opponent channels, and thereby restore the balance 
between opponent channels in order to process subsequent inputs with as little bias as possible. 
The two ways of causing an antagonistic rebound are a sudden decrease of a previously sustained 
input to one channel of the opponent circuit (see Figure 2), and a sudden increment of arousal to 
both channels. 
A sudden decrease of input to one channel (say, the "fear" channel, or the "red" channel) 
can lead to a transient activation, or antagonistic rebound of activity, in the opponent channel (say, 
the "relief' channel, or the "green" channel). Antagonistic rebound has many functional uses. For 
example, when there is a sudden decrease of fearful cues in a given situation, then both classical 
conditioning and instrumental conditioning mechanisms can use the relief rebound as a source of 
positive motivation with which to learn the sensory-motor contingencies that led to the reduction of 
fear (cf., Denny, 1971; Grossberg, l982b, l984b, 1987b; Masterson, 1970; McAllister and 
McAllister, l97la, 197lb; Reynierse and Rizley, 1970). Likewise, if hypothalamic stimulation 
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elicits a given behavior, then its offset can transiently elicit an opposite behavior (Cox, 
Kakolewski, and Valenstein, 1969; Valenstein, Cox, and Kakolewski, 1969). 
A sudden increment in arousal may be due to an unexpected event (Banquet and 
Grossberg, 1987; Grossberg, 1984a, 1987; Naatiinen and Gaillard, 1983; Naatanen, Simpson, 
and Loveless, 1982; Renault and Lesevre, 1978). Such a rebound can disconfirm and reset 
ongoing sensory, cognitive, motivational, and motor processing in order to enable the brain to 
better process the unexpected information and deal with it adaptively. 
3. Underaroused and Overaroused Depressive Syndromes 
The mechanisms that enable a gated dipole to achieve these useful emergent properties at 
normal arousal levels also generate clinically relevant properties when the arousal level is chosen 
too low or too high. As noted in Figure 1, an underaroused gated dipole generates a syndrome of 
Underaroused Depression. Here, due to an abnormally small arousal level, inputs must be larger 
than normal in order to overcome the dipole's increased response threshold. Paradoxically, once 
inputs are chosen large enough to overcome this threshold, then the circuit is hyperexcitable 
above threshold, meaning that the dipole generates abnormally large outputs in response to 
additional input increments. This is paradoxical because a naive view might conclude that an 
elevated threshold would make the circuit less, rather than more, excitable. Because such a circuit 
is hyperexcitable at low arousal levels, its excitability can be brought into the normal range by 
increasing its arousal until it reaches the peak of the Inverted-U. Here, the threshold is lower, but 
the network's excitability is also lower. These properties clarify the paradoxical fact that an 
arousing drug can make some patients less excitable. This fact is more completely discussed below 
in terms of how amphetamines help attention deficit disorder, or juvenile hyperactivity, patients 
(Swanson and Kinsbourne, 1976; Weiss and Hechtmann, 1979) and L-dopa helps Parkinson's 
patients (Riklan, 1973). 
It is not, however, the case that unlimited increases in arousal will make a dipole behave 
more normally. Too much arousal generates a syndrome of Overaroused Depression. Here the 
extra arousal causes the response threshold to be very low. Paradoxically, however, the circuit is 
hypoexcitable above this low threshold, so that it generates small responses, at best, to inputs of 
arbitrary size. Thus "too much of a good thing", such as amphetamine or L-dopa for the patients 
mentioned above, can create a new, and complementary, problem to the one for which they are 
being treated. For example, large doses of amphetamine and L-dopa can cause a psychosis 
reminiscent of schizophrenia (Riklan, 1973; Wallach, 1974), although, L-dopa has also been 
reported to improve negative schizophrenic symptoms (Albert and Rush, 1983; Gerlach and 
Luhdorf, 1975). These arousal problems are discussed below in terms of negative symptoms such 
as flat affect in schizophrenia, and how it may lead to other schizophrenic symptoms through its 
interactions with other brain processes. In the opposite direction, antipsychotic drugs that block 
dopamine receptors (Kuhar, Atweh, and Bird, 1978) can, in sufficient quantities, produce a 
catalepsy suggestive of Parkinson's disease (Hornykiewicz, 1975). 
4. The Whole is Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Arousal, Transmitters, 
Signals, Competition, and Thresholds are the Pat·ts 
The paradoxical emergent properties of a gated dipole are due to five basic mechanisms 
acting together (Grossberg, 1972b, 1980, 1984a, 1984b). Figure 2 depicts the simplest example of 
a circuit that realizes these mechanisms. The two dipole channels are called the ON and OFF 
channels in the subsequent exposition. The ON channel is turned on by a phasic input, denoted by 
J in Figure 2; the OFF channel registers the antagonistic rebound that occurs when the phasic input 
to the ON channel shuts off. The five mechanisms are: (1) a source of nonspecific arousal, denoted 
by I in Figure 2, energizes both channels of the dipole; (2) a nonlinear signal function, denoted by 
.fin Figure 2, transduces the sum of phasic and arousal inputs to each channel; (3) a habituative 
transmitter substance multiplies, or gates, the nonlinear signals from both channels; (4) the gated 
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signals compete via an on-center off-surround network; and (5) the net signal after competition is 
half-wave rectified, or thresholded, before generating an output from the network. 
The key mechanism that governs dipole dynamics is the habituative transmitter gate. This 
mechanism varies on a slower time scale than the rate with which input signals fluctuate, and 
thereby provides the "memory" that calibrates the size of the antagonistic rebound. This transmitter 
process was originally derived as the minimal mechanism whereby data about associative learning 
could be explained using a chemical transmitter capable of generating an unbiased signal from one 
cell to another (Grossberg, 1968, 1969a). Transmitter habituation occurs when the recovery rate of 
the transmitter falls behind the input fluctuation rate. Similar model mechanisms have been used to 
explain how the relative timing of paired presynaptic and postsynaptic signals can influence the 
strength of the adaptive weights, or associations, that link presynaptic to postsynaptic cells 
(Markram et al., 1997). Other early work (e.g., Grossberg, 1972a, 1972b, 1980, 1982b, 1984a, 
1984b; Grossberg and Gutowski, 1987) has explained many data about normal cognitive and 
emotional processing using habituative chemical transmitters operating in a gated dipole within a 
larger network architecture. It is because so many data about normal cognitive-emotional behaviors 
have been clarified by these circuits that their ability to map onto clinical properties in their 
underaroused and overaroused regimes takes on such potential significance. 
Figure 3 illustrates how, in response to a changing input signal S(t), a habituative 
transmitter z(t) can gradually equilibrate to the signal's more rapidly changing amplitudes. In 
particular, higher input amplitudes lead to lower levels of transmitter. The transmitter z(t) 
multiplies, or gates, the input S(t) to generate a gated output signal T(t) = S(t)z(t). Due to this 
gating process, monotonic changes in input amplitude S(t) cause overshoots and overshoots in the 
gated output T(t), before the transmitter gradually equilibrates, or habituates, to the new input 
level. In this simplified model, the transmitter accumulates to a fixed equilibrium concentration at a 
constant rate, and is inactivated, or habituates, at a rate proportional to T(t). 
Figure 3 
Figure 2 shows what happens when such a habituative transmitter is embedded within a 
gated dipole, notably in the dipole's square synapses. Here the transmitter in the ON channel gates 
the sum of the phasic input J and the tonic arousal input I after they are transformed by the signal f 
(variable x1 in Figure 2). As a result, just as in Figure 3, increases and decreases the total input I + 
J are transformed by the habituative transmitter into overshoots and undershoots of the gated signal 
(variable x3 in Figure 2). When these overshoots and undershoots are processed by the on-center 
off-surround network and the output threshold, a habituative response in the ON channel (variable 
ON in Figure 2) and a transient antagonistic rebound in the OFF channel (variable OFF in Figure 
2) are produced. The antagonistic rebound is energized by the arousal input I, which can activate 
the OFF channel even after the phasic input J to the ON channel shuts off. The effects of the phasic 
input J depend upon interactions between all the five mechanisms that define the dipole. These 
interactions determine the arousal levels I at which the dipole is in the mid-point of its Inverted-U 
or at an underaroused or overaroused extreme. 
Perhaps the most recent experimental evidence for such habituative transmitters in the brain 
has been reported by Abbott et al. ( 1997), who have used the same law to explain their data about 
"depressing synapses" in the visual cortex. Their data exhibit many of the habituative transmitter 
properties that had previously been used to model other vision data (e.g., Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1981; Francis and .Grossberg, 1996a, 1996b; Francis, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 
1994; Grossberg, 1980, 1987a; Ogmen, 1993; Ogmen and Gagne, 1990). 
5. Recurrent Opponent Processes Can Actively Modulate Associative Learning 
Opponent processes often include feedback pathways within and between their ON and 
OFF channels, as illustrated in Figure 4. These feedback pathways realize a type of short-term 
memory whereby the opponent process maintains a steady operating level against sufficiently small 
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environmental perturbations, and switches between different pathways when a sufficiently large 
environmental change occurs. For example, a motivational dipole can hereby maintain a steady 
level of motivation during the performance of a consummatory act, and cannot be reset by 
insignificant environmental distractions. 
Feedback pathways can also regulate how learning occurs by ensuring that associative 
synapses which input to the opponent circuit respond only to the circuit's net activity after 
opponent competition takes place. In this way, the circuit can dissociate the read-out of previously 
learned associations from the read-in of new associations. Read-in senses only the competitive 
"decision" that is made by the opponent interactions. This is called the associative dissociation 
property. 
Figure 4 
Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989) have modeled how recurrent opponent processing circuits 
may operate during reinforcement learning. Here the opponent channels represent opponent drive 
states, such as fear and relief. The name "READ circuit" was used to describe this circuit because it 
is a Recurrent Associative Dipole that combines opponent processing with associative learning 
(Figure 4). The READ circuit enables the associative dissociation property to be realized in a 
simple way, as noted below. It hereby realizes several useful properties: learning can go on 
indefinitely without saturating the associative memories; these memories can persist until they are 
disconfirmed by unexpected events; and network learning is buffered against noise. 
Dissociation is realized by placing the associative synapses on dendritic spines. Read-out of 
old associative values occurs at the dendritic spines and then propagates towards the cell body 
where they may or may not succeed in generating cell firing. Those cells which do fire and whose 
firing survives opponent competition may fire long enough to trigger retrograde dendritic spikes 
that invade the dendritic spines. Here they can drive read-in of new associative values at those 
synapses which are receiving concurrent presynaptic signals. This use of retrograde dendritic 
spikes from the cell body to dendritic spines as a way to dissociate associative read-out from read-
in has been a recurrent theme during the development of the model and its extensions (e.g., 
Grossberg, 1975, 1987, p. 38; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1987). Remarkable experimental 
progress has recently been made towards characterizing how retrograde dendritic spikes can 
influence associative learning at dendritic spine sites (Johnston et al., 1996; Koester and 
Sakmann, 1998; Magee and Johnston, 1997; Markram et al., 1997). It still remains to test whether 
or not these spikes are used to achieve associative dissociation. One type of direct test would 
monitor such retrograde spikes and their associative consequences during two conditions. In both 
conditions, the inputs to the recorded dendritic apparatus would be the same. In one condition, its 
cell body would "win" the recurrent competition with a nearby stimulated cell; in the other, it 
would Jose the competition. Learning should be greater in the former case. 
6. Control of Attention and Action by Cognitive-Emotional Intemctions 
READ circuits and their variants may be embedded within model representations of 
cognitive, emotional, and motor processes. Interactions among these representations lead to 
emergent properties that resemble symptoms of mental disorders when the dipoles are 
underaroused or overaroused. Some of these interactions are schematized in Figure 5 in their 
simplest form. Circuits of this type will be called Co gEM circuits henceforth in order to abbreviate 
their Cognitive, Emotional, and Motor interactions. CogEM models have undergone progressive 
development to explain ever more behavioral and neural data about normal cognitive-emotional 
interactions, including reinforcement learning and attention (e.g., Buonomano, Baxter, and Byrne, 
1990; Grossberg, 1971, 1972a, 1972b, 1982a, 1982b; Grossberg and Gutowski, 1987; 
Grossberg and Levine, 1987; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1987; Grossberg and Merrill, 1992, 
1996). The CogEM architecture may be derived from simple and broadly accepted hypotheses 
about how associative learning occurs (see Grossberg 1982b). 
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Figure 5 summarizes the hypothesis that (at least) three types of internal representation 
interact during reinforcement learning: sensory and cognitive representations S, drive 
representations D, and motor representations M. The S representations are thalamocortical 
representations of external events, including the object recognition categories that are learned by 
inferotemporal and prefrontal cortical interactions (Desimone, !991; Gochin, Miller, Gross, and 
Gerstein, 1991; Harries and Perrett, 1991; Mishkin, Unger! eider, and Macko, 1983; Ungerleider 
and Mishkin, 1982). The D representations include hypothalamic and amygdala circuits at which 
homeostatic and reinforcing cues converge to generate emotional reactions and motivational 
decisions (Aggleston, 1993; Bower, 1981; Davis, 1994; Gloor et a!., 1982; Halgren et al, 1978; 
LeDoux, 1993). TheM representations include cortical and cerebellar circuits that control discrete 
adaptive responses (Evarts, 1973; Ito, 1984; Kalaska et al., 1989; Thompson, 1988). More 
complete models of the internal structure of these several types of representations are developed 
elsewhere (e.g., Bullock, Cisek, and Grossberg, 1998; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1994; 
Contreras-Vidal, Grossberg, and Bullock, 1997; Fiala, Grossberg, and Bullock, 1996; Grossberg, 
1987b; Grossberg and Merrill, 1996; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1987). Even the model in its 
simplest form has successfully learned to control motivated behaviors in mobile robots (e.g., 
Baloch and Waxman, 1991; Chang and Gaudiano, 1998; Gaudiano and Chang, 1997; Gaudiano, 
Zalama, Chang, and Lopez-Coronado, 1996). 
Figure 5 
Three types of learning take place among these representations: The S -.> D conditioned 
reinforcer learning converts a conditioned stimulus (CS) into a reinforcer by pairing activation of 
its sensory representationS with activation of the drive representation D, where representation D is 
activated by an unconditioned stimulus (US) or other previously conditioned reinforcer CS's. The 
D -.> S incentive motivational learning enables an activated drive representation D to prime, or 
modulate, the sensory representations S of all cues, including the CSs, that have consistently been 
correlated with it. Activating D hereby generates a "motivational set" by priming all of the sensory 
and cognitive representations that have been associated with that drive in the past. These incentive 
motivational signals are a type of motivationally-biased attention. The S -.> M motor, or habit, 
learning enables the sensorimotor maps, vectors, and gains that are involved in motor control to be 
adaptively calibrated. 
These processes control the learning, recognition, and recall of sensory and cognitive 
memories ("declarative memory"; Mishkin, 1982, 1993; Squire and Cohen, 1984) and the 
performance of learned motor skills ("procedural memory"; Gilbert and Thatch, 1977; Ito, 1984; 
Thompson, 1988). In particular, learned S-.> D -.> S positive feedback quickly draws attention to 
motivationally salient cues by amplifying the activation of their sensory representations. The 
sensory representations use recurrent interactions to store these activities in short-term, or 
working, memory (Baddeley, 1986). This is accomplished by linking the sensory representations 
by a recurrent on-center off-surround network, whereby cells excite themselves and possibly their 
immediate neighbors, and inhibit a wider range of cells, possibly including themselves (Figure 5). 
Such a network enables the sensory representations to store activities that retain their sensitivity to 
the relative sizes of their inputs, while also tending to conserve, or normalize, the total activity 
among the representations (Bradski, Carpenter, and Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg, 1973, 1978a, 
1978b). This activity normalization property realizes the lin1ited capacity of short-term memory, 
since when one sensory representation gets very active, the representations with which it competes 
are forced to become less active. 
7. Two Types of Distmctability due to Overaroused Drive Representations 
Taken together, these learning and short-term memory mechanisms help to explain data 
(Kamin, 1968, 1969; Pavlov, 1927) about how attention can be focused on motivationally salient 
cues, and "blocked" from being allocated to less salient or irrelevant cues: When the sensory 
6 
representations S that categorize conditioned reinforcers are amplified by their strong S ~ D ~ S 
attentional feedback pathways, they can block activation of other S populations via S ~ S lateral 
inhibition. (Grossberg and Levine (1987) have presented model simulations of attentional 
blocking.) In a more elaborate version of the model, the drive representations are built up from 
motivational READ circuit dipoles that code such opponent drive states as fear and relief 
(Grossberg and Schmajuk, I 987). 
If these emotional dipoles are overaroused, for any number of reasons, then they cannot be 
effectively activated by their sensory and cognitive inputs. Their activities remain small no matter 
how large these inputs become. The result is flat affect, because the dipoles cannot generate a large 
emotional response. As a consequence of this reduced response, the dipoles cannot generate 
adequate incentive motivational feedback signals with which to activate motivationally compatible 
sensory representations (see Figure 5). These sensory representations thus cannot successfully 
compete for attention based upon their motivational salience. Nor can they control the release of 
motivationally appropriate responses. In the absence of motivationally directed attention, 
motivationally irrelevant cues can attract attention and generate inappropriate responses. In 
summary, overaroused drive representations can lead to flat affect and distractability. 
These problems may elicit additional cognitive problems as a result of the way in which the 
motivational circuits interact with other circuits in the brain. For example, attentional and 
consummatory circuits compete with orienting circuits for the control of behavior (Grossberg, 
1980; Staddon, 1983), as schematized in Figure 6. This property realizes a competition between 
the circuits that process expected events and those that process unexpected events. The latter 
circuits help to incorporate the unexpected events, notably unfamiliar events, into the corpus of 
expected and familiar events through learning. The competition between attcntional and orienting 
systems enables such learning to take place without forcing unselective forgetting of previously 
learned knowledge (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 1980; Grossberg and Merrill, 
1996). 
A simple example illustrates what this competition means: Suppose that you hear a sudden 
and unexpected loud noise to your right. The noise elicits a rapid orienting movement to look at the 
loud noise for further processing. On the other hand, suppose that you are trained to use the loud 
noise as a discriminative cue for pushing a button to receive a large monetary award. Then the 
orienting responses can be supplanted by consummatory responses such as button-pressing. When 
motivational dipoles in the drive representations D are overaroused, then they cannot adequately 
inhibit the orienting circuits with which they interact. As a result, overarousal can disinhibit 
orienting responses in response to any events that happen to occur, and cannot prevent these 
distracting responses from occurring when motivationally salient events arc happening. 
Figure 6 
Overarousal of opponent drive representations can hereby have multiple effects. It can 
cause flat affect by desensitizing emotional dipoles to emotionally charged events. It can cause 
distractability in at least two ways: Overarousal can reduce the incentive motivational signals that 
help to focus attention upon motivationally relevant events (motivational distractability), and it 
can disinhibit orienting reactions whereby irrelevant events can continually disrupt attentional 
processing (orienting distractability). Hyperreactive orienting reactions may hereby be generated 
by hyporeactive emotional reactions (Ellinwood and Kilbey, 1980). 
The incentive motivational pathways in Figure 5 have been inteqJreted as generators of 
Continent Negative Variation, or CNV, event-related potentials, that covary with expectancy, 
decision (Walter et al., 1964), motivation (Cant and Bickford, 1967; Irwin et al., 1966), volition 
(McAdam et al., 1966), preparatory set (Low et al., 1966), and arousal (McAdam, 1969). The 
orienting reactions have been interpreted in terms of the N200 event-related potential, that has been 
linked to the processing of unexpected events (Banquet, Renault, and Lcsevre, 1981; Naatanen, 
Simpson, and Loveless, 1982; Renault and Lesevre, 1978). The CogEM model hereby suggests 
how both the CNV and the N200 can become abnormal in an overarouscd emotional syndrome. 
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The model also suggests how the P300 event-related potential can also become abnormal in 
this way. In particular, Co gEM interactions have been embedded within a larger framework, called 
Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, which also models how recognition categories are learned 
and recognized (Grossberg, 1982b, 1984b). ART suggests how the orienting subsystem may reset 
short-term memory in response to unexpected events, and thereby drive a memory search for a 
better-matching recognition category with which to represent the unexpected event. This short-term 
memory reset event has been interpreted in terms of the P300 event-related potential (Banquet and 
Grossberg, 1987; Grossberg, 1978a, 1982b, 1984b ). Grossberg and Merrill (1996) have 
summarized how the CogEM model can be embedded into an ART recognition learning model that 
also includes learning of adaptively-timed motivated attention and movement. This extension 
clarifies how the CNV becomes adaptively timed. 
8. Polyvalent Interactions between Sensory, Drive, and Motor Representations 
Where in the brain do such interactions occur? In order to make this connection, the circuit 
in Figure 5 needs to be expanded. In its present form, after a reinforcing cue activates its sensory 
representation S, it can activate a motor representation M even as it sends conditioned reinforcer 
signals to a drive representation D. Thus a motor response can be initiated before the sensory 
representation receives incentive motivational feedback to determine whether the sensory cue 
should generate a response at that time. For example, eating behavior could be initiated before the 
network could determine if it was hungry. 
Even in the circuit of Figure 5, each drive representation D obeys a polyvalent constraint 
whereby it can generate incentive motivational output signals only if it gets a sufficiently large 
primary or conditioned reinforcer input at the same time that it gets a sufficiently large internal drive 
input. The internal drive input designates whether an internal drive, such as hunger, thirst, sex, 
etc. is high and in need of satisfaction. Different drive representations exist to represent these 
distinct internal homeostatic states. Due to the polyvalent constraint, an external cue cannot activate 
strong incentive motivation, and with it action, to satisfy a drive that is already satisfied. On the 
other hand, the circuit, as it stands, could trigger such an action even if incentive motivational 
support is not forthcoming. A way is needed to prevent the sensory representation from triggering 
an action until it gets incentive feedback from a motivationally-consistent drive representation. 
Figure 7 
Figure 7 describes the minimal network in which this property can be achieved (Grossberg, 
1971; Grossberg and Levine, 1987). In it, the sensory representation corresponding to a given cue 
is broken into two stages, or populations, rather than the single stage in Figure 5. Presentation of a 
given cue, orCS, activates the first stage of its sensory representation. This activation is stored in 
short-term memory using the positive feedback pathways within the sensory representation. This 
stored activity gives rise to output signals to all the drive representations with which the sensory 
representation is linked, as well as to the second stage of its sensory representation. The second 
stage of its sensory representation obeys a polyvalent constraint: It cannot fire unless it receives 
converging signals from the first stage and from a drive representation. 
To see how this works, suppose that the first stage of the sensory representation has a 
strong connection to one or more drive representations, whether the prewired connection of a 
primary reinforcer or the learned connection of a conditioner reinforcer. If the sensory 
representation strongly activates a drive representation when the drive representation is receiving a 
sufficiently large drive input, then the polyvalent constraint of the drive representation is satisfied 
and the drive representation can fire. All the drive representations that are active at that time 
compete among themselves to allow the most active one--the one that represents the best 
combination of sensory and drive information at that moment--to fire. If the winning drive 
representation has a strong prewired or learned incentive motivational pathway to the second stage 
of the cue's sensory representation, then the polyvalent constraint of the second stage is overcome, 
and the sensory representation can fire. Such firing can control the release of motivationally 
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compatible actions. In summary, by making the final stages of both the sensory and the drive 
representations polyvalent, then the S _., M motor pathways are activated only if the S _., D _., S 
feedback pathway can get sufficiently activated. 
9. Motivational Amplification and Blocking of Sensory and Cognitive Processing 
Figure 7 indicates how the second stage of sensory representation may be gated by 
motivational signals. How does the first stage of sensory representation benefit from motivational 
modulation? The model proposes that excitatory feedback pathways exist from the second stage to 
the first stage. Keep in mind that the second stage receives motivational input only if a drive 
representation with which it is associated is prepotent in the present cognitive-emotional context. 
Only those second stage representations that receive these motivational signals can fire. As a result, 
positive feedback from the second stages to the first stages amplifies those active first-stage 
sensory representations that are motivationally prepotent in the present context. This provides the 
motivational amplification of activity that enables these sensory representations to attentionally 
block less salient representations viaS _., S lateral inhibition. 
Figure 7 illustrates why feedback from higher to lower stages of sensory and cognitive 
processing is needed to simultaneously achieve motivationally-appropriate sensory attention and 
responding. In particular, the top-down feedback enables motivationally-relevant selection of 
distributed information on the lower level of processing. Such top-down feedback is also needed to 
prevent sensory and cognitive learning from being destabilized and eroded by the "blooming 
buzzing confusion" of irrelevant events (Grossberg, 1980, 1995). 
10. Interactions between Sensory Cortices, Amygdala, and Orbital Prefrontal 
Cortex 
The circmt m Figure 7 may, in principle, be replicated at multiple stages in the 
thalamocortical and corticocortical elaboration of environmental cues. One such brain circuit is 
depicted in Figure 8. This figure is taken from Barbas (1995), who noted that many different types 
of sensory cortex, including visual, somatosensory, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory cortex, are 
connected to both the amygdala and to the orbital prefrontal cortex. In this interpretation of Figure 
7, the various sensory cortices play the role of the first stages of the sensory representations, the 
orbital prefrontal cortex plays the role of the second stages of the sensory representations, and the 
amygdala plays the role of the drive representations. The amygdala has been identified in both 
animals and humans to be a brain region that is involved in learning and eliciting memories of 
experiences with strong emotional significance (Aggleston, 1993; Davis, 1994; Gloor et al., 1982; 
Halgren et al, 1978; LeDoux, 1993). The feedback between the second and first sensory stages 
may be interpreted as an example of the ubiquitous positive feedback that occurs between cortical 
regions (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Macchi and Rinvik, 1976; Sillito et al., 1994; Tsumoto, 
Creutzfeldt, and Legendy, 1978; van Essen and Maunsell, 1983). 
Figure 8 
11. Schizophrenia and Aronsal: Cognitive-Emotional Interactions 
The formal symptoms of the CogEM model when its drive representations are overaroused 
(or underaroused) are strikingly reminiscent of schizophrenic symptoms. This linkage was made in 
Grossberg (1972b, !984a, 1984b) in an attempt to connect neural mechanisms of normal 
cognitive-emotional behavior with properties of schizophrenic behavior. Some of the main 
symptoms are now reviewed. Because the model is still under development, the proposed linkage 
is necessarily incomplete. In addition, other model mechanisms that are reviewed below may also 
contribute to schizophrenic behaviors; not all of these symptoms are attributed to direct and indirect 
effects of improperly aroused emotional dipoles. 
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Some types of schizophrenia have been ascribed to dopamine hyperactivity of various parts 
of the limbic system, including increased dopaminergic input to the amygdala (Lloyd, 1978; 
Reynolds, 1983, 1987). This type of effect may be interpreted as an overaroused condition. This 
hypothesis is consistent with data showing that dopaminergic agonists, such as L-dopa and 
amphetamine, can produce a behavioral syndrome that has been compared to schizophrenia 
(Riklan, 1973; Stevens, 1993; Torrey and Peterson, 1974; Wallach, 1974), although L-dopa has 
been reported to improve negative schizophrenic symptoms (Albert and Rush, 1983; Gerlach and 
Luhdorf, 1975). In the opposite direction, various antipsychotic drugs block dopamine receptors 
(Kuhar et a!., 1978) and in sufficient quantities can produce a catalepsy that resembles 
Parkinson's disease (Hornykiewicz, 1975). This latter result, which suggests that some 
schizophrenics and Parkinson's patients are at opposite ends of a dopamine continuum, is 
consistent with model properties in the underaroused state that resemble Parkinson's disease (see 
below). More generally, the facts that an underaroused syndrome can be transmuted into an 
overaroused syndrome using a given drug, and that the reverse transformation can be caused by an 
oppositely acting drug, suggest that the two syndromes may be extremal points on an Inverted-U 
of a common mechanistic substrate, albeit one that may exist in multiple brain regions for different 
behavioral purposes. Because opponent processes like gated dipoles are assumed to exist in many 
brain regions, too much of a drug that is aimed at correcting a dopaminergic imbalance in one brain 
region may create an opposite dopaminergic imbalance in that and other brain regions. Multiple 
secondary effects, including lateralized effects that are different in different brain hemispheres, may 
also occur due to these dopaminergic abnormalities (Early eta!., 1994), but these are beyond the 
scope of the present chapter. 
When the drive representations of Figure 7 are overaroused, the interpretation of this circuit 
using Figure 8 is consistent with data suggesting a possible involvement of prefrontal cortices in 
schizophrenia (Weinberger, 1988). In support of the CogEM model hypothesis that the prefrontal 
sensory representation gates the release of properly motivated actions, Ft1ster (1989) has concluded 
from studies of monkeys that the orbital (ventral) prefrontal cortex helps to suppress inappropriate 
responses. These monkey data are consistent with clinical evidence that patients with injury to 
orbital prefrontal cortex tend to behave in an inappropriate manner (Blumer and Benson, 1975; 
Liddle, 1994). Other research has suggested that schizophrenia may involve a chronic deficiency in 
striatal glutamate transmission due to decreased activity in those regions of the prefrontal cortex 
that project to the striatum (Andreasen, 1990; Carlsson, 1988; Grace, 1991; Lynch, 1992). One 
possible cause of decreased prefrontal activity may be a reduction in incentive motivational signals 
from overaroused (or underaroused) amygdala circuits that project to the prefrontal cortex. 
Other symptoms of schizophrenia are also similar to model properties. Since the time of 
Kraepelin (191311919), it has been noted that schizophrenics have difficulties with attentional 
control, motivation defects, and disorganization of behavior. Kraepelin wrote: "This behavior is 
without doubt clearly related to the disorder of attention which we very frequently find 
conspicuously developed in our patients. It is quite common for them to lose both inclination and 
ability on their own initiative to keep their attention fixed for any length of time" (pp. 5-6). 
Attentional deficits in schizophrenia have also been emphasized by a number of other workers; 
e.g., Bleuler (191111950), Braff ( 1985) and Mirsky (1969). 
Liddle ( 1994) has refined this analysis by segregating schizophrenic symptoms into "three 
distinguishable syndromes: ( 1) psychomotor poverty (poverty of speech, flat affect, decreased 
spontaneous movement); (2) disorganization (disorders of the form of thought, inappropriate 
affect); and (3) reality distortion (delusions and hallucinations)" (p. 43), which have been 
supported by several studies (Arndt eta!., 1991; Pantel is eta!., 1991; Sauer et a/., 1991). Liddle 
suggested that two of these syndromes "reflect volitional disorders: psychomotor poverty reflects a 
difficulty initiating activity and disorganization reflects a difficulty in the selection of appropriate 
activity" (p, 43). Both of these problems are, moreover, associated with impairment in 
neuropsychological tests of frontal lobe function (Liddle and Morris, 1991 ). 
The CogEM model suggests that one possible source of flat affect may be in overaroused 
emotional centers, such as the amygdala and its projections, and that this flat affect can lead to 
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multiple deficits in behaviors that require the ability to sustain motivated attention on a 
consummatory task. Modeling work has not yet explicitly characterized how brain mechanisms of 
speech and movement control react to overarousal, although Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen 
(1997) and Bullock, Cisek, and Grossberg (1998) have modeled speech and movement control 
mechanisms that include volitional gain control mechanisms that may malfunction during certain 
mental disorders. One can nonetheless already discern how symptoms of poverty of speech, 
decreased spontaneous movement, disorders of the form of thought, and inappropriate affect might 
all be influenced by how flat affect reduces the incentive motivational signals that normally energize 
these behaviors. Reality distortions are ascribed below to overarousal of a different type of brain 
circuit. 
12. How do Schizophrenics Lose a "Theory of Mind"? 
Frith (1992, 1994) has interpreted schizophrenic symptoms as impairments in the 
processes that underlie a "theory of mind", including the ability to represent beliefs and intentions. 
For example, when asked to describe photographs of people, schizophrenics described their 
physical appearance, rather than their mental states (Pilowsky and Bassett, 1980). Frith noted, 
however, that the theory of mind approach "does not explain the other major feature of negative 
schizophrenia: their impoverishment of will (Frith, 1994, p. 150). He also wrote that "mental 
states include not only affects and emotions, but also goals and intentions. A person who was 
unaware of their goals could, on the one hand, be a slave to every environmental influence or, on 
the other hand, be prone to perseverative or stereotyped behavior, because they would not have the 
insight to recognize that certain goals were unobtainable or inappropriate" (Frith, 1994, p. 151 ). 
The present model provides an intuitive framework that can begin to explain both types of 
behavior. Concerning the impoverishment of will: This loss may be linked to the flattening of 
affect and the consequence collapse of incentive motivational signals. Without these 
emotional/motivational resources, all mental activities that depend upon interpreting one's own 
emotional state, as well as the emotional states of others, will be diminished. Concerning goals and 
intentions: Without adequate incentive motivational signals, the prefrontal representations, such as 
those schematized in Figures 7 and 8, will not be adequately activated. Without adequately 
activated prefrontal representations, their top-down signals to earlier sensory and cognitive 
processing stages will be eliminated. As a result, these earlier representations will not be able to 
organize information according to its emotional meaning or to the individual's motivational goals. 
In addition, motivationally irrelevant information will not be adequately blocked from attention, 
thereby making it difficult to maintain attention upon motivationally relevant events. Or, in 
Kraepelin's words, schizophrenics "lose both inclination and ability on their own initiative to keep 
their attention fixed for any length of time." This summary illustrates how a problem that is 
localized within one type of brain circuit can seriously disturb cognitive and emotional processing 
throughout the entire network with which that circuit interacts. 
The model summarized in Figure 7 has been extended in various ways. One extension 
suggests how the hippocampal system may interact with cortical and amygdala circuits to learn new 
recognition categories and to adaptively time motivated attention to match situational constraints. 
Grossberg and Merrill (1996) have reviewed this extension and suggested why the cerebellum also 
contains adaptively timed circuits for the control of movement. Fiala, Grossberg, and Bullock 
( 1996) have modeled adaptive timing in terms of the metabotropic glutamate receptor system. 
13. Contingent Negative Variation vs. Readiness Potential 
The CogEM model helps to clarify the functional difference between the Contingent 
Negative Variation, or CNV, event-related potential (Brunia, Haagh, and Scheirs, 1985; 
Bribaumer et al., 1990; Walter et al., 1964) and the Bereitschaftspotential, or BP, or readiness 
potential (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965). The BP is a DC potential that precedes motor action by l 
to 2 seconds, and appears to originate in the Supplementary Motor Cortex. The CNV is a slow 
negative potential of prefrontal origin that occurs even earlier than the BP, and has been associated 
with an animal's expectancy, decision, motivation, volition, preparatory set, and arousal (Fuster, 
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1995). Figure 9 summarizes the model hypothesis (Grossberg, 1975, Figure 10; Grossberg, 
1987b, p. 67) of how these two events may be related. 
Figure 9 
The functional need for this anatomical distinction may be understood from the following 
example. Consider the incentive motivational feedback that is generated by positive and negative 
drive representations. Both types of drive representation carry positive incentive motivational 
signals, because it is just as important to pay attention to a source of fear as it is to pay attention to 
a source of pleasure. These positive incentive signals can amplify the sensory representations 
corresponding to fearful or pleasurable events, and thereby rapidly focus attention on them. For 
example, in his experiments on the effects of mood on memory, Bower (1981) found that sad-
congruent lists are learned no worse than happy-congruent lists. He also found that incongruent 
moods can interfere with recall, which can be explained by the competitive interactions between 
drive representations and cue representations. On the other hand, many conditioning data (e.g., 
Estes, 1969; Estes and Skinner, 1941; Grossberg, 1972a; Maier, Seligman, and Solomon, 1969; 
Reynolds, 1968) describe how fearful and other negative drive sources can suppress responding. 
How can attention be drawn to fearful cues at the same time that these cues can suppress 
responding? 
The CogEM model proposes that the incentive motivational inputs to the prefrontal cortex 
have positive sign, but that subsequent processing stages in the elaboration of motor actions may 
be modulated by both positive and negative motor arousal sources, which may also be used for the 
control of approach and avoidance behaviors. The former signals arc linked to the CNV event-
related potential, the latter to the BP event-related potential. Although this distinction would have to 
be carried much further to understand the details of how such responses are planned and executed, 
its very existence illustrates that decreased activity in prefrontal cortex undergoes processing at 
multiple stages before it influences observable actions. 
14. Schizophrenia as an Overaroused Syndrome: Working Memory and Learned 
Serial Order 
The Invcrted-U that occurs in an opponent process is not the only type of Inverted-U that 
can influence abnormal behaviors. Another Inverted-U has been proposed to occur during the 
processing of serially ordered events, such as a sentence or a planned series of actions. Such a 
sequence of events is temporarily stored in working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Grossberg, 1978a, 
1978b) before relationships between the events are encoded in long-term memory by associative 
learning. A model of this process has been developed (Grossberg, 1969b, 1978a, 1978b; 
Grossberg and Pepe, 1970, 1971) in which sequences of events cause working memory 
activations that decay due to interference by subsequent events and the passage of time. These 
active short-term memory traces generate learning signals which sample the distribution of activity 
across all the other event representations. Lateral inhibition among the representations enables the 
strongest associations to suppress weaker ones. In more complex versions of the model, as 
sequences of events are encoded in working memory, they trigger learning of cognitive planning 
chunks, or categories, that are selectively activated by particular event sequences. These chunks, in 
turn, learn to predict which subsequent events will occur. 
Grossberg and Pepe ( 1970, 1971) discovered an Inverted-U that occurs when such 
networks Jearn and perform sequentially ordered series of events at different levels of arousal. The 
underaroused end of this Inverted-U is easily understood in terms of an insufficient amount of 
arousal with which to energize the learning and encoding of short-term memory patterns into long-
term memory. The overaroused end of the Inverted-U is more difficult to understand because an 
ample amount of arousal is available with which to energize learning and performance. However, 
the patterning of learning and performance through time is seriously impaired by overarousal. It 
has been mathematically proved (see Grossberg, 1974 and 1982a, for reviews) that when all of the 
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representations in such an associative network are ovcraroused, there is a reduction of associative 
span, contextual collapse, and noisy network activations. In other words, the network loses its 
ability to represent plans and other higher-order contextual representations that depend upon 
sequential information. The resulting contextual collapse, fuzzy response categories, and punning 
based on low-order associations arc also characteristics of schizophrenia (Maher, 1977). 
These properties may clarify how the positive schizophrenic symptom of thought 
derailment may arise. Andreason ( 1979) defines derailment as "A pattern of spontaneous speech in 
which the ideas slip off the track onto another that is clearly but obliquely related, or onto one that 
is completely unrelated." This happens in overaroused serial learning networks because they 
cannot represent the higher-order temporal contexts that can keep thoughts "on track." Other 
positive symptoms, such as auditory hallucinations and thought insertions may also be, at least in 
part, due to the collapse of the ability to maintain a sequential context long enough for its meaning 
to be elaborated, and the decrease in the network's signal-to-noise ratio. Several types of evidence 
point to regions of the prefrontal cortex, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the regions 
with which it interacts, as a substrate of working memory and its associative consequences 
(Fuster, 1973, 1989; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Milner, 1982). 
Figure 10 
A synthesis of these proposed cognitive and emotional sources of arousal lead to the 
(greatly oversimplified) schematic shown in Figure I 0 of how several positive and negative 
schizophrenic symptoms may be generated in patients who may be generally overaroused. As 
noted below, however, because there is an inverted-U as a function of arousal in a gated dipole, 
some properties of overarousal can also be caused by underarousal. To the extent that these 
properties are due to opponent processes like gated dipoles, they can be differentiated by 
parametric properties of underarousal such as the following. 
15. The Underaroused Depressive Syndrome 
A number of paradoxical properties are generated together in an underaroused gated dipole. 
These properties, which are listed below, are mathematically proved in the Appendix, and 
interpreted below in terms of symptoms of attention deficit disorder and Parkinson's disease. 
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A. Elevated Response Threshold to Phasic Inputs. The output threshold is elevated in 
response to a phasic input 1 (see Figure 2). In other words, a larger intensity 1 is needed to elicit a 
positive ON-output from an underaroused dipole. 
B. Suprathreshold Hypersensitivity. The ON-reactions are hypersensitive to increments 
in input intensity 1 that exceed the elevated threshold. In other words, larger than normal ON-
outputs are produced by suprathreshold input increments in an underaroused dipole than in a 
normally aroused dipole. 
C. Sensitivity is Brought Down by a Drug that Brings Arousal "Up". These 
hypersensitive reactions are reduced by a drug that acts like an arousal "upper." In other words, a 
drug that causes a parametric increase in arousal level I (see Figure 2), or leads to an equivalent 
effect through an action taking place at previous or subsequent processing stages, decreases dipole 
sensitivity to increments in 1. 
D. Too Much "Up" Causes an Overaroused Syndrome. Too much of an "upper" drug 
can depress output size by carrying the dipole over its inverted-U into the overaroused (large l) 
range. 
E. Hyposensitive OFF-Reactions Occur to Phasic Input Decrements. This is ttue 
despite the fact that hypersensitive ON-reactions occur in response to phasic input increments. In 
particular, no OFF-rebound may occur in response to cutting the phasic input 1 in half to 112, and 
cutting an input 112 to 0 may cause an abnormally small OFF-rebound. Since OFF-rebounds act to 
reset the dipole, underaroused dipoles may substitute paradoxical ON-reactions for the OFF-
reactions that would have occurred in the normally aroused case. 
F. Paradoxical Dishabituation by Unexpected Events. Sudden increments L1l in arousal 
level that cause an OFF-rebound in a normally aroused dipole can cause a paradoxical 
enhancement, or dishabituation, of the previous ON-response in an underaroused dipole. As a 
result, event representations that may have been attentionally blocked, or ignored, as being 
irrelevant, may attract attention when an unexpected event occurs. 
16. Attention Deficit Disorder as an Undemroused Depressive Syndrome 
How these properties reflect themselves in the brain depends upon where the affected 
dipoles may be found. For example, in a case where sensory and/or motivational dipoles are 
affected, symptoms relevant to attention deficit disorder may be created, whereas when motor 
dipoles are affected--as in the basal ganglia systems that control how motor actions, among other 
processes, are gated ON and OFF (e.g., Horak and Anderson, 1984a, 1984b)--symptoms familiar 
from Parkinson's disease emerge. 
Consider, for example, the case of sensory dipoles and its interpretation in terms of 
attention deficit disorder. Here, the elevated response threshold to phasic cues may clarify why 
thresholds during an electroencephalic audiometry test are reduced by medications such as 
amphetamine (Weber and Sulzbacher, 1975). The suprathreshold hypersensitivity defines the 
behavioral syndrome. The reduction of sensitivity by an arousal "upper" may be compared with the 
fact that children exhibiting this syndrome often suffer from catecholamine deficiencies (Shaywitz 
eta!., 1977; Shekim et al., I 977) and amphetamine-type drugs are used as a treatment (Swanson 
and Kinsbourne, I 976; Weiss and Hechtmann, I 979). 
The property that too much "upper" causes an overaroused syndrome can be compared to 
data showing that an amphetamine psychosis can occur in response to large drug doses (Ellinwood 
and Kilbey, 1980; MacLennan and Maier, I 983). The property that hyposensitivity of OFF-
reactions may occur to halving of a sensory cue (1 -7 1/2) is unknown. For example, does cutting 
a reward or punishment in half cause an abnormally small affective reaction of opposite sign? Does 
halving the intensity of a previously sustained visual cue cause an abnormally small negative after 
effect? 
Finally, the property of paradoxical dishabituation by unexpected events predicts that 
irrelevant sensory cues can attract attention after an unexpected event occurs. To the extent that a 
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reduced reset event maps into a reduced P300, such a reduction of the P300 may be expected to 
correlate with enhanced attention to irrelevant events. 
17. Parkinson's Disease as an Underaroused Depressive Syndrome 
In the case of Parkinson's disease, the elevated response threshold to phasic inputs is 
translated into the difficulty which Parkinson's patients have in initiating movements (Briley and 
Marien, 1994). The suprathreshold hypersensitivity is translated into their difficulty in terminating 
movements after they begin. The fact that they can be treated by an arousal "upper" translates into 
the fact that, for example, in Parkinson's disease, dopamine-rich cells of the substantia nigra show 
marked degeneration (Weiner and Klawans, 1978) and L-dopa, a dopaminergic agonist, is used as 
a treatment. 
The fact that too much of an "upper" can cause an overaroused syndrome is interpreted in 
terms of the fact that too much L-dopa can elicit schizophrenic symptoms (Riklan, 1973; Wapach, 
1974). The fact that these extremes are part of the same Inverted-U is illustrated by the fact that 
antipsychotic drugs that block dopamine receptors (Kuhar, Atweh, and Bird, 1978) can, in 
sufficient quantity, produce a catalepsy akin to Parkinson's disease (Hornykiewicz, 1975). 
The predicted hyposensitivity of OFF-reactions to decrements in phasic inputs (J -o> J/2) 
seems to be unknown. The paradoxical dishabituation by unexpected events has a natural analog in 
the fact that Parkinson bracing occurs in response to an unexpected push; that is, "if suddenly 
pushed forward or backward while standing, many people with Parkinson's brace rigidly without 
stepping, or with short shuffling steps which are unable to counteract their fall" (Schaller! et a!., 
1979). Why do not these patients right themselves as normal people do, or just fall over? In the 
model, these bracing reactions may be at least partly caused by the enhanced ON-reactions of the 
motor commands that were active before the push. An enhanced ON-reaction would strengthen the 
current motor pattern, rather than rebounding it to an antagonistic pattern that could facilitate a 
righting reaction. The hypothesis that such reactions are due to underaroused circuits are consistent 
with data showing that intraventricular application of 6-0HDA severely depletes brain 
catecholamines and thereby produces symptoms such as catalepsy, akinesia, and Parkinson 
bracing (Levitt and Teitelbaum, 1975; Schaller! et al., 1978a, 1978b, 1979). This interpretation 
suggests the utility of studying how novelty-mediated motor potentials may vary with the amount 
of bracing. 
Identification of a key opponent processing circuit and how it may be afflicted during a 
disease like Parkinson's is only one step in developing a more complete neural theory of the 
disease. Contreras-Vidal and colleagues (e.g., Contreras-Vidal ct al., 1998; Contreras-Vidal and 
Stelmach, 1995; Teulings et al., 1997; Van Gemmer! et al., 1998) have suggested how a gated 
dipole circuit, suitably specialized, may be embedded within a larger theory of sensory-motor 
control (e.g., Bullock, Cisek, and Grossberg, 1998; Bullock and Grossberg, 1988; Bullock, 
Grossberg, and Guenther, 1993; Bullock, Grossberg, and Mannes, 1993) to provide a more 
complete explanation of Parkinsonian symptoms. 
18. Weber Law Models of Mental Disorders: Similar Symptoms with Opposite 
Causes? 
By contrast with the hyperractive orienting reactions that may be indirectly released by a 
hyposensitive overaroused gated dipole, the hyperreactive reactions that can occur in an 
underaroused gated dipole are direct properties of this circuit. Although these two types of 
reactions may look similar to casual behavioral analysis, they may be differentiated in terms of their 
triggering events and parametric properties. Likewise, although both underaroused and 
overaroused depressive syndromes may both cause a reduction in output from an afflicted brain 
region, whether amygdala, basal ganglia, or prefrontal cortex, these reductions may be due to 
different, indeed, opposite causes that lie a polar ends of an Inverted-U. Some authors view 
schizophrenic and Parkinsonian symptoms as having a similar cause (e.g., Ingvar, 1996), whereas 
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others suggest that "although the pattern of impairment [of schizophrenics] was similar to that seen 
in Parkinson's disease, different underlying processes may be involved in the two conditions" 
(Pantelis and Nelson, 1994, p. 223). The existence of opponent processes that exhibit similar 
properties at opposite ends of their lnverted-U make the interpretation of these data more difficult. 
Neural models of normal cognitive and emotional behaviors may provide an additional tool 
by which the brain mechanisms underlying these abnormal behaviors may be unified, classified, 
and explained. The habituative dynamics of arousal-modulated opponent processing circuits have 
been particularly rich in data implications. In addition to the types of properties that have been 
summarized herein, gated dipoles have been used to explain data about decision making under risk, 
gambling, memory repression, self-punitive behaviors, eating disorders, analgesic effects, and 
sleep rhythms, among others (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1983, 1984, 1985; Grossberg, 1972a, 
1972b, 1982b, 1984b; Grossberg and Gutowski, 1987). 
That such a simple combination of neural mechanisms can begin to rationalize a wide range 
of normal and abnormal behavioral and neural properties provides converging evidence that 
mechanisms of this type are used by the brain. A key component in these explanations is the way 
in which tonic arousal sets the sensitivity to phasic inputs when they both activate habituative 
transmitters and opponent competition. Taken together, these properties realize a Weber Law 
explanation of various mental disorders. Such a Weber Law, as in visual psychophysics, suggests 
how the size of a baseline or tonic input can influence the sensitivity to a phasic input that is 
superimposed upon it. 
Grace (1991) has also described a Weber Law model of schizophrenia in which tonic 
baseline signals play a key role in determining the brain's sensitivity to phasic inputs. As in the 
present theory, Grace notes that low arousal can cause hyperreactive responses to phasic inputs, 
whereas high arousal can cause hyporeactive responses, and uses this hypothesis to interpret data 
about dopamine metabolism in more detail than was attempted here. Grace suggests that low 
arousal due to abnormally low prefrontal activity is the basis of schizophrenia. He does not focus 
on the possible causative role of limbic overarousal or underarousal in causing flat affect and, with 
it, low levels of prefrontal activity. The model of Grace also does not incorporate the possible role 
of opponent interactions, and does not make significant contact with behavioral data. 
Thus, although the Grace (1991) model and the Grossberg (1972b, 1984a, 1984b) model 
both emphasize Weber Law processing as key in these mental disorders, there are significant 
differences in other model hypotheses. Deciding definitively between them may require more 
complete models of how the prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, amygdala, and their interactions with 
other brain regions generate behavioral properties. Such models are currently being developed in a 
number of laboratories world-wide. A better mechanistic understanding of the neural substrates of 
schizophrenia and other arousal-modulated mental disorders may thus soon be available. 
APPENDIX: GATED DIPOLES 
Al. TRANSMITTERS AS GATES 
The transmitter model presented here was derived from associative learning postulates in 
Grossberg (1968, 1969a). The gated dipole model was derived from conditioning postulates in 
Grossberg ( 1972b ). The transmitter derivation that is given below suggests that this transmitter law 
is the minimal dynamic law for unbiased transmission using a depletable signal (Grossberg, 1980). 
We start by asking the following question: What is the simplest law whereby one nerve cell 
can send unbiased signals to another nerve cell? The simplest law says that if a signal S passes 
through a given nerve cell v P the signal has a proportional effect 
T = SB, (I) 
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where B > 0, on the next nerve cell v 2• Suppose, in addition, that the signal from v 1 to v 2 is due 
to the release of a chemical z(t) from v 1 that activates v2 • If such a chemical transmitter is 
persistently released when S is large, what keeps the net signal, T, from getting smaller and 
smaller as v 1 runs out of transmitter? Some means of replenishing or accumulating the transmitter 
must exist to counterbalance its depletion due to release from v 1• To accommodate this 
interpretation, we can rewrite (1) in the form 
T= Sz 
and ask: How can the system keep z replenished so that 
z(t) = B 
(2) 
(3) 
at all times t? This is a question about the sensitivity of v 2 to signals from v" since if z could 
decrease to small values, then even large signals S would have only a small effect on T. Equation 
(2) has the following interpretation. The signal, S, causes the transmitter, z, to be released at a 
rate T = Sz. Whenever two processes, such as S and z, are multiplied, they are said to interact by 
mass action, or that z gates S. Thus, (2) says that z gates S to release a net signal T, and (3) 
says that the cell tries to replenish z to maintain the system's sensitivity to S. The simplest law 
that joins together both (2) and (3) is the following differential equation for the net rate of change, 
dz/dt, of z: 
dz = A(B-z)-Sz. 
dt 
Equation (4) describes the following four processes going on simultaneously. 
(4) 
Accumulation or Production and Feedback Inhibition: The term A(B- z) enjoys 
two possible interpretations, depending on whether it represents a passive accumulation process or 
an active production process. In the former interpretation, there exist B sites to which transmitter 
can be bound, Z sites are bound at timet, and B- z sites are unbound. Then tenn A(B- z) says 
that transmitter is bound at a rate proportional to the number of unbound sites. In the latter 
interpretation, two processes go on simultaneously. Term AB on the right-hand side of (4) says 
that Z is produced at a constant rate AB. Term - Az says that once z is produced, it inhibits the 
production rate by an amount proportional to the concentration of z. In biochemistry, such an 
inhibitory effect is called feedback inhibition by the end product of a reaction. Without feedback 
inhibition, the constant rate of production, AB, would eventually cause the cell to burst. With 
feedback inhibition, the net production rate is A(B- z), which causes z(t) to approach the finite 
amount B, as we desire by (3). The term A(B- z) thus enables the cell to accumulate a target 
level B of transmitter. 
Gating and Release: Term -Sz in (4) says that z is inactivated or released at a rate Sz. 
As in (2), inactivation or release of Z is due to a mass action interaction, or gating, of S by z. 
Equations (2) and (4) describe the simplest dynamic law that corresponds to constraints (2) 
and (3). These equations reconcile the two constraints of unbiased signal transmission and 
maintenance of sensitivity when the signals are due to release of transmitter. 
A2. WEBER-LAW ADAPTATION AND HABITUATION 
To determine how the net signal, T = Sz, reacts to a sudden change in S, as in Figure 3, 
suppose that z(t) reacts slowly compared to the rate with which S(t) can change. For definiteness, 
suppose that S(t) = So for all times t :S: to and that, at time t = t0, S(t) suddenly increases to S1. 
By (4), z(t) reacts to the constant value S(l) =So by approaching an equilibrium value z(to). This 
equilibrium value is found by setting dz/dt = 0 in (4) and solving for 
AB 
z(to) = (5) 
A+So 
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By (5), a larger value of So causes more transmitter to be inactivated or released. In other words, 
z(t0 ) is a decreasing function of So. By contrast, (2) implies that the net signal to v 2 at time t0 is 
ABS0 SozCto) = . (6) 
A+So 
By (6), the rate of transmitter release is an increasing function of So. Now Jet S(t) switch to the 
value S1 > S0 . Because z(t) is slowly varying, z(t) approximately equals z(to) for awhile after 
t = t0 . Thus, the net signal to v2 during these times is approximately equal to 
• ABS1 St~~)= . 0) 
A+So 
Equation (7) has the same form as a Weber Jaw, J(A + I)-1. The signal S1 is evaluated relative to 
the baseline, S0 , just as J is evaluated relative to I. This Weber Jaw is due to slow intracellular 
adaptation of the transmitter gate to the input level through time. It is not due to fast intercellular 
lateral inhibition across space (Grossberg, 1980, Appendix C and D), which also obeys a Weber 
law. Many of the properties derived below are due to this intracellular Weber Jaw. 
As z(t) in (4) begins to respond to the new transmitter level, S = S1, z(t) gradually 
approaches the new equilibrium point that is determined by S = S1, namely 
AB 
z(=) = --. (8) 
A+S1 
The net signal consequently decays to the asymptote, 
S\z(=) = ABSI . 
A+S1 
Thus, after S(t) switches from S0 to S1, the net signal Sz jumps from (6) to (7) 
gradually decays to (9). The exact course of this decay is described by the equation 




for t ~ t0, which shows that the rate, or gain, A + S1 of the response increases with the signal S1, 
just as in the case of shunting lateral inhibition (Grossberg, 1980). The sudden increment followed 
by slow decay can be intuitively described as an overshoot followed by habituation to the new 
sustained signal level, S1 (see Figure 3). Both intracellular adaptation and habituation occur 
whenever a transmitter fluctuates more slowly than the signals that it gates. 
The size of the overshoot can be found by subtracting (9) from (7). For definiteness, let 
So = f(l) and S1 = f(l + J), where f( w) is a function that transmutes the inputs I and I+ J 
that exist before and after the increment J into net signals S0 and S1, respectively. Then the 
overshoot size is approximately 
s z(t ) - S z( =) = ABf (I + J) [f(l + J) - f(l) J . 
I I I [A+f(/)][A+f(/+J)] (11) 
Section A4 below shows that the rebound size in response to specific cue offset is related to (11) in 
a way that allows both f( w) and the arousal level, I, to be estimated. 
Intracellular habituation due to a slow transmitter gate is not the only type of habituation in 
the brain. An intercellular variety of habituation can also occur. After a feedback expectancy is 
learned, a mismatch of the feedback expectancy with feedforward data can trigger an orienting 
reaction by dishabituating the network's orienting subsystem (Grossberg, 1980; Grossberg and 
Merrill, 1996). Feedback expectancies and slow gates are both needed to regulate perceptual and 
motivational events, but they arc quite distinct mechanistically. 
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Figure II 
A3. A GATED DIPOLE 
It is shown below how, if transmitters gate signals before the gated signals compete, as in 
Figure 2, then antagonistic rebound can be elicited by offset of a specific cue, as in light-ON 
versus light-OFF, or fear versus relief. It is also shown how unexpected events can cause an 
antagonistic rebound. They do this by triggering an increase in the level of nonspecific arousal that 
is gated by all the transmitter pathways. 
Figure II depicts the simplest network in which two channels receive inputs that are gated 
by slowly varying transmitters before the channels compete to elicit a net output response. In such 
a feedforward gated dipole, specific phasic inputs are turned on and off by internal or external cues 
and nonspecific arousal inputs are on all the time, or tonic, even though their size can vary through 
time. Each channel can have its own sum of specific inputs, K1 or K 2 , such as hunger or satiety 
drive inputs, respectively, that are added to positive or negative conditioned reinforcer signals. 
Both channels also receive the same arousal input, L. The total signals to the two channels are, 
therefore, S1 = f(K1 + L), where the signal function, f(w), is monotone increasing. 
The relative sizes of S1 and S2 and their rates of change through time relative to the 
transmitter fluctuation rate determine whether an antagonistic rebound will occur. To emphasize 
this fact, let 
I= min(K1 + L,K2 + L) (12) 
and 
(13) 
The quantity I determines the network's net arousal level and .! determines how asymmetric the 
inputs are to the two channels (cf., Figure 2). Suppose, for definiteness, that K1 > K2. Then 
S1 = f(l + .!) and S2 = f(l). The notational shift from S1 = f(KJ + L) and S2 = j(K2 + L) to 
S1 = f(l + .!) and S2 = f(l) in (12) and (13) is motivated by more than formal convenience. The 
notation I and .! emphasizes that the dipole does not know how many input sources are 
perturbing it through time. All it can compute is the net arousal level, I, and the degree of 
asymmetry, .! , above I, whether one or a million input sources are active. If a million cues 
equally perturb the ON-channel (positive reinforcers) and another million cues equally perturb the 
OFF-channel (negative reinforcers), the net effect of all the cues will be to increase I, not .T. 
Thus, after dipole competition takes place, all these cues need not generate any incentive 
motivation. On the other hand, by increasing I, these cues can alter the sensitivity of the dipole to 
other asymmetrically distributed inputs due to the dipole's Inverted- U properties. This is the kind 
of simple but subtle distinction that the I and .! notation emphasizes. 
A4. REBOUND DUE TO PHASIC CUE OFFSET 
A rebound can be caused if, after the network equilibrates to the input .! , the input is 
suddenly shut off (see .! in Figure 2). This effect is analogous to the reaction that occurs when a 
previously sustained light is shut off or a previously sustained aversive cue is shut off. To see how 
this rebound is generated, suppose that the arousal level is I and that the cue input is .! . Let the 
total signal in the ON-channel be S1 = f(l + .!) and that in the OFF-channel be S2 = f(l). Let the 
transmitter in the ON-channel, z1, satisfy the equation 
d 
-zl = A(B-z1)-SJZ1 (14) 
dt 
and the transmitter in the OFF-channel, z2 . satisfy the equation 
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d 
-z2 = A(B-z2)-S2z2. (15) dt 
After z1 and z2 equilibrate to S1 and S2 , (d/dt)z1 = (d/dt)z2 = 0. Thus, by (14) and (15), 
AB 




z = 2 A+ s2 
(17) 
Since S1 > S2, it follows that Z1 < z2; that is, Z] is habituated more than 22. However, the gated 
signal in the ON-channel is S1z1 and the gated signal in the OFF-channel is S2z2 . Since 
S z - ABSI 
I I- A+SI (18) 
and 
(19) 
it follows from the inequality S1 > S2 that S1z1 > S2z2, despite the fact that ZI < 22. Thus, the ON-
channel gets a bigger signal than the OFF-channel. After the two channels compete, the input J 
produces a sustained ON-output whose size is proportional to 
S -S _ A2B[f(l+J)-f(l)] 
]ZI 222 - [A+ f(l)][A + .f(l + J)] (20) 
Division of the overshoot amplitude (II) by the sustained ON-output amplitude (20) yields an 
interesting relationship between the size of the overshoot in the ON-channel and the size of the 
steady-state ON-output; namely, 
on -overshoot .f(l + J) (21) 
steady on- output A 
which provides an estimate of .f(w) if J is parametrically varied. In particular, if .f(w) is a linear 
signal, f( w) = w, then (20) becomes 
2 
S z - S z = A BJ (22) 
I ·I 2 2 (A+ I)( A+ I+ J) 
which is an increasing function of J (more fear given more shock) but a decreasing function of I 
(analgesic effect). 
Now shut J off to see how an antagonistic rebound (relief) is generated. The cell potentials 
,;, X 
rapidly adjust until new signal values, Si = f(l) and S2 = f(l), obtain. However, the 
transmitters z1 and z2 change much more slowly, so that (16) and ( 17) are approximately valid in 
a time interval that follows .1 offset. Thus, the gated signals in this time interval approximately 
equal 




* * Thus, S1 z1 < S2 z2. The OFF-channel now gets the bigger signal, so an antagonistic rebound 
occurs, the size of which is approximately 
s* _ s* _ ABf(l)[f(l + 1)- fUll 
2Z2 '1 ZJ - [A+ f(l)][A + f(l + J)]. (25) 
Division of the rebound amplitude (25) by the steady-state ON-output (20) yields an interesting 
relationship between the maximal OFF-rebound-output and the steady ON-output; namely, 
of/- rebound f(l) 
on- output A 
(26) 
which provides an estimate of f(w) as I is parametrically varied. A comparison of (21) with (26) 
shows that, as I is parametrically varied, (21) should have the same graph as (26), shifted by 1. 
This comparison provides an estimate of J (that is, of how the behavioral input is transformed into 
neural units) and also a strong test of the model. Once f(w) is estimated, (20) and (25) can be 
verified. If f(w) = w in (25), then 
* * ABIJ 
S2z2 = S1z1 = (A+l)(A+I+J) (27) 
The rebound is then an increasing function of J (offset of larger shock elicits more relief) and an 
Inverted- U function of I (an optimal arousal level exists). 
The rebound is transient (see OFF in Figure 2) because the equal signals, S1 = S2 = f(l) 
gradually equalize the z1 and z2 levels until they both approach AB(A + f(/))- 1. Then S1z1 - S2z2 
approaches zero, so the competition between channels shuts off both of their outputs. 
AS. REBOUND DUE TO AROUSAL ONSET 
A surprising property of gated dipoles is their reaction to sudden increments in the arousal 
level, I. Such increments may, for example, occur in response to unexpected events. Suppose that 
the ON-channel and the OFF-channel have equilibrated to the input levels I and J. Now suddenly 
* * * * * increase I to I , thereby changing the signals to S1 = f(l + 1) and S2 = f(l ) The transmitters 
z1 and z2 continue to obey (16) and (17) for awhile, with S1 = f(l + J) and S2 = f(l). A 
rebound occurs if S~z2 > s; z1. In general, 
s* z - s·*z = AB[t(l*l- f(l* + J)] + B[f(l")f(l! J)- f(l)f(l* + J)] 
2 2 , I ·I [A+ f(l)][A + f(l + .!)] 
In particular, if f( w) = w, a rebound occurs whenever 
l'>I+A, 
since then 
* * ABJ(/'- I- A) 




Thus, given a linear signal function, a rebound will occur if / exceeds I+ A no matter how J is 
chosen. If the event is so unexpected that it increments the arousal level by more than amount A, 
then all dipoles in the network will simultaneously rebound. Moreover, the size of the OFF-cell 
rebound increases as a function of the size of the ON-cell input, J, as (30) shows. In particular, 
no rebound occurs if the ON-cell was inactive before the unexpected event occurs. Thus, the 
rebound mechanism is selective. It rebounds most vigorously those cells which are most active 
(J >> 0) and spares inactive cells (.! = 0). 
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A6. INVERTED-U IN DIPOLE OUTPUT 
The inverted U effect holds if f(w) is a sigmoid, or S-shaped, function; that is, if 
f(O) = dfjdw(O) = 0, df/dw(w) > 0 if w > 0, f(co) <co, and d2 f / dw2 (w) changes sign once 
from positive to negative as w increases. Sigmoid signal functions are found in many neural 
systems if only because of their noise suppression and contrast-enhancement properties (cf., 
Grossberg, 1980). In particular, if f(w) is sigmoid, an Inverted-U occurs in the sustained ON-
output (20) as I is parametrically increased, despite the fact that an Inverted- U does not obtain in 
(22) when /( w) is linear. The results are simplified by using the signum function 
sgn{w}= +I ifw>O, Oifw=O,and -1 ifw<O. (31) 
First consider the ON-reaction in (20), which is denoted by x5 (Figure I 1 ). Writing the derivative 
of a function g(/) as g'(I), then, by (20), for each fixed J, 
sgn {x5(1)} = sgn {A 2 [f'(/ + J)- f'(I)] + 2A[f(l)f'(l + 1)- f(l + J)f'(I)] 
+ [/2 (l)f'(l + J)- !2(1 + J)f'(l)]}. 
(32) 
Since f(w) is sigmoid, 
Thus, by (32) and (33), 
At large values of I, 
whereas 
f(O) = f'(O) = 0. 
sgn{x5(0)} = sgn{A2f'(J)} > 0. 
f(I + J) > f(l), 





Consequently, each term in brackets on the right-hand side of (32) is negative. Thus, at large I 
values, 
sgn {x5(1)} < 0 (37) 
The inequalities (34) and (37) show that, for fixed J, x5 (!) increases and then decreases as a 
function of I. This is the Inverted- U for the ON-reaction. In fact, since f( co) < co, (20) implies 
that lim 1__,= x5(1) = 0. A similar proof holds for the OFF-reaction. 
A7. HYPERSENSITIVE UNDERAROUSED REACTION TO PHASIC 
INCREMENTS 
To illustrate why the underaroused syndrome is hypersensitive to phasic increments, 
suppose that I is chosen abnormally small and, consequently, that f(I) is very small because of 
f's S-shaped graph. Let J represent the intensity of a fearful cue (e.g., a shock level) and let the 
dipole ON-output (20) be correlated with the amount of fear. Since I is so small, the "fear 
threshold is raised" in the sense that a larger value of J is needed to create a large net ON-output 
than when I is chosen in the "normal" range. Although the fear threshold is high, once J is 
chosen sufficiently large to elicit a detectable net ON-reaction, additional increments in J create 
larger than normal increments in fear. This is because the terms f(I) in the numerator and 
denominator of (20) are abnormally small. More precisely, differentiating (20) with respect to J, 
we find the rate at which the ON-output increases to unit increases in J. This rate is 
jJ_ (S z - S z ) = A 2 Bf' (I+ J) . 
(}] I I 2 2 [A+ f(I + J)]2 (38) 
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If I+ 1 is chosen so that f(l + 1) is small but growing rapidly, then f'(l + 1) is relatively large 
when the denominator, [A+ f(l + 1)]2 , is relatively small. In other words, underaroused 
depression is hyperexcitable despite its high threshold. 
AS. PARADOXICAL ON-REACTION TO UNEXPECTED EVENTS AND 
DIFFERENTIAL ENHANCEMENT OF UNATTENDED CUES 
Two other properties of underaroused dipoles are related to Parkinsonian bracing. These 
properties, like underaroused hyperexcitability, are due to the faster-than-linear, or threshold, 
behavior of the S-shaped signal function, f(w), at small activity values, w. Neither property 
holds if the signal function is linear, say f(w) = w. In particular, by (30), when f(w) = w, an 
arousal increment M in response to an unexpected event causes a rebound whenever !}I > A. The 
minimal M capable of causing a rebound is independent of the ambient arousal level, I. This 
property does not hold when f(w) grows faster than linearly, say f(w) = w2, which 
approximates the sigmoid shape of f(w) at low arousal levels. By (28), a rebound occurs when 
f(w) = w2 only if 
M > g(/,1), (39) 
where the function 
7j 7j 
•(1, 1 )= A-I(l+1)+(A+I
2 ) -[A+(/+1)2]-
g 2I + 1 (40) 
is a decreasing function of I. In fact, g(l, 1) approaches 0 as I is chosen arbitrarily large. Thus, a 
much larger !}I is needed to rebound an underaroused dipole than a normally aroused dipole. 
Moreover, if M < A1-1, then when I= 0, 
J [(l+M-t-1)2 _(l+M)2l>O. (41) 
J(M) A-t-(1+1)2 A-t-I2 
In other words, an arousal increment can actually enhance the ON-output of an underaroused 
dipole instead of rebounding the dipole. 
Use of a sigmoid function also helps explain how, in response to an arousal burst, 
previously unattended sensory representations can be enhanced even while very active sensory 
representations are inhibited. This is because the function g(l, 1) is a decreasing function of 1, as 
well as of I. This means that it is easier to rebound a more active sensory representation than a 
less active sensory representation. 
A9. PARADOXICAL LACK OF REBOUND TO PHASIC DECREMENT: 
ORDERING OF REINFORCEMENT MAGNITUDE 
This section illustrates how several behavioral indices should all covary as arousal level is 
parametrically increased. The first index says that reducing 1 units of shock (or other negative 
reinforcer) to 1/2 units is less rewarding (i.e., produces a smaller rebound) than reducing 1/2 
units of shock to 0 units, despite the fact that both operations reduce shock by 1/2 units. This 
result is based on the fact that (20) and (25) include Weber law ratios of I and 1 terms as well as 
differences of I and 1 terms. A formula has been derived that predicts when reducing 11 units of 
shock to K2 units at arousal level h is more reinforcing than reducing h units of shock to K2 
units at arousal level I2 (Grossberg, 1972b). To make these assertions, assume that the size of the 
relief rebound caused by reducing the shock level is proportional to the rewarding effect of the 
manipulation, other things being equal. 
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To simplify the computations, it is convenient to use a signal function 
j(w) = max(w- C,O). (42) 
Such a signal function has a threshold C, below which it equals 0 and above which it grows 
linearly. This threshold function approximates a sigmoid function in the activity range before 
saturation occurs. Denote the steady-state ON-reaction that occurs after a specific input of intensity 
J is kept on for S time units by x5 (S, J ~ K) and the OFF-rebound that occurs when intensity J 
is switched to Kat timet= S by x6(S+,J ~ K). To compute x6(S+,J ~ K), the transmitters z 
are approximated by their steady-state values at t = S and the potentials x by their new steady-state 
values in response to input K. 




x s+ 1 ~ - = ---"'2----
6 ' 2 ( D + /)( D + I + J) ' 




from which it also follows that 
and 
5 (D+I)(D+l+J) 





. + J - 2 XG S ,- ~ 0 - J 
2 (D+I)(D+/+2) 
x6 (S+,K ~ 0) = A-l(l- C) 
x5(S,K ~ 0) 






x6 ( s+, ~ ~ o) > x6 ( s+,J ~ ~} (48) 
or that cutting J units in half is less rewarding than shutting off J /2 units. In addition, the ratio 
(47) increases with I, as in the more general equation (26). Substituting (47) into (43) shows that 
2B J ·-l(S K 0 + K 
x (s+,J ~ !._) = ~ 2rx5 , ~ )x6(S , ~ 0)-1] 
6 2 (D+ I)(D+ I+ J) (49) 
By (49), an arousal level that favors the possibility of learned avoidance in the presence of fearful 
cues (i.e., the OFF-rebound is much bigger than the ON-response so that the right hand side of 
(49) is positive) also favors a large rewarding effect when the shock level is halved. If I is chosen 
to be small (underarousal), then x6 in (43) can be negative (no rebound occurs) even if x6 in (46) 
is positive (a rebound occurs). 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure l. Gated dipole opponent processes exhibit an Inverted-U as a function of arousal level, 
with underaroused and overaroused depressive syndromes at the two ends of the Inverted-U. 
Figure 2. The simplest feedforward gated dipole circuit. In response to a phasic input 1 and tonic 
arousal input I, the dipole generates an ON-response and a transient antagonistic OFF-rebound due 
to the action of the habituative transmitter gates within the square synapses. See text and Appendix 
for details. 
Figure 3. In response to rapid increases and decreases in input amplitude S(t), the habituative 
transmitter z(l) decreases and increases in the reverse direction. The gated output signal T(t) = 
S(t)z(t) is the product of these fast and slow reactions, and generates overshoots and undershoots 
to the changes in S(t), followed by habituation to an intermediate level. 
Figure 4, A READ circuit: This circuit joins together a recurrent gated dipole with an associative 
learning mechanism. Learning is driven by signals from sensory representations S which activate 
associative weights that learn activation levels within the ON-channel and OFF-channel of the 
dipole. 
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Figure 5. The simplest CogEM circuit. At least three types of representations-sensory S, drive 
D, and motor M-interact to control cognitive-emotional interactions. At least three types of 
learning-conditioned reinforcer, incentive motivational, and motor learning-connect these 
representations. Conditioned stimuli (CS) activate the S representations, which compete among 
themselves for limited-capacity short-term memory activation and storage. The activated S 
representations elicit conditionable signals to drive representations and motor representations. See 
text for details. 
Figure 6. Competition occurs between consummatory and orienting circuits. Here it is realized 
between drive representations and orienting representations. 
Figure 7. Each sensory representation possesses (at least) two stages with STM activities x,, and 
x,. A CS or US input activates its corresponding Xn· Activation of xn generates signals to x, and 
conditioned reinforcer signals to D. In response to a conditioned reinforcer CS, conditioned 
incentive motivational signals from D activate the second stages x", which deliver feedback signals 
to the corresponding first stages x,1• Some first stages xil are hereby amplified by conditionable 
feedback and block activation of other, less favored, sensory representations. Motor learning is 
elicited by sensory-motor signals from the winning x, to the motor representations. 
Figure 8. Caudal orbitofrontal areas receive projections from sensory cortex (visual, 
somatosensory, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory) and from the amygdala, which also receives 
inputs from the same sensory modalities. (Reprinted with permission from Barbas (1995).) 
Figure 9. Distinct incentive pathways: The positive attentional feedback pathway from both 
positive and negative drive representations is distinguished from the positive or negative feedback 
pathways by which positive and negative reinforcers can activate or suppress movements, or 
control approach and avoidance movements. 
Figure 10. Schizophrenia as an overaroused depressive syndrome: Overarousal of emotional 
opponent processes and of cognitive circuits for short-term and long-term memory of sequentially 
organized events (e.g., language, motor plans) can yield a combination of positive and negative 
symptoms. 
Figure 11. (a) Specific inputs ( K1 and K2 ) and a nonspecific input ( L) have the same effect on a 
gated dipole as (b) a specific input I and a net arousal level I if K1 > K2. 
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Figure I. Gated dipole opponent processes exhibit an Inverted-U as a function of arousal level, 




















Figure 2. The simplest feedforward gated dipole circuit. In response to a phasic input J and tonic 
arousal input/, the dipole generates an ON-response and a transient antagonistic OFF-rebound due 




















Figure 3. In response to rapid increases and decreases in input amplitude S(t), the habituative 
transmitter z.(t) decreases and increases in the reverse direction. The gated output signal T(t) = 
S(t)z(t) is the product of these fast and slow reactions, and generates overshoots and undershoots 
to the changes in S(t), followed by habituation to an intermediate level. 
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Figure 4. A READ circuit: This circuit joins together a recurrent gated dipole with an associative 
learning mechanism. Learning is driven by signals from sensory representations S which activate 

















Figure 5. The simplest CogEM circuit. At least three types of representations-sensory S, drive D, 
and motor M-interact to control cognitive-emotional interactions. At least three types of learning-
conditioned reinforcer, incentive motivational, and motor learning-connect these representations. 
Conditioned stimuli (CS) activate the S representations, which compete among themselves for 
limited-capacity short-term memory activation and storage. The activated S representations elicit 
conditionable signals to drive representations and motor representations. See text for details. 
-Drive Orienting 
Figure 6. Competition occurs between consummatory and orienting circuits. Here it is realized 
between drive representations and orienting representations. 
DRIVE INPUT 
Figure 7. Each sensory representation possesses (at least) two stages with STM activities xi1 and 
xi,. A CS or US input activates its corresponding Xa. Activation of xi1 generates signals to xi, and 
conditioned reinforcer signals to D. In response to a conditioned reinforcer CS, conditioned 
incentive motivational signals from D activate the second stages x12 , which deliver feedback signals 
to the corresponding first stages xiJ' Some first stages xi1 are hereby amplifed by conditionable 
feedback and block activation of other, less favored, sensory representations. Motor learning is 
elicited by sensory-motor signals from the winning xi2 to the motor representations. 
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Figure 8. Caudal orbitofrontal areas receive projections from sensory cortex (visual, 
somatosensory, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory) and from the amygdala, which also receives 








Figure 9. Distinct incentive pathways: The pos1t1ve attentional feedback pathway from both 
positive and negative drive representations is distinguished from the positive or negative feedback 
pathways by which positive and negative reinforcers can activate or suppress movements, or 
control approach and avoidance movements. 
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Figure I 0. Schizophrenia as an overaroused depressive syndrome: Overarousal of emotional 
opponent processes and of cognitive circuits for short-term and long-term memory of sequentially 























Figure 11. (a) Specific inputs ( K1 and K2 ) and a nonspecific input ( L) have the same effect on a 
gated dipole as (b) a specific input J and a net arousal level I if K1 > K2 . 
